ASA Adjudication on NO2ID

Ad

An ad in the New Statesman was headlined "I work on the Identity Card system for the UK Government." Below, text stated ">The "National Identity Register" is the most detailed citizen database of its kind in the world. I am security cleared, which means I can get anything I want, on any UK resident. Address, heath info, financial records, criminal records, whatever. >It's all meant to be stored securely but anyone who works on the project knows it can't be. Better yet, I have a contact who works for a mobile telephone company, so sometimes I can cross-match a person to their geographical location for the last six months or more. I know exactly who they speak to. And when their mother calls. And where she lives, too. >I sell information, if the price is right. Trade is good at the moment. It's mostly private investigators and newspapers, but I get some unusual stuff too. I don't ask questions. It's nothing personal; it's just business. >I am God :o)". Text below read "The Government wants state management of personal identity. It isn't simple. Or safe. NO2ID is a non-partisan campaign to stop it. Join us. www.no2id.net".

Issue

The complainant objected that the ad:

1. misleadingly exaggerated the information that would be held on the National Identity Register and how staff would be able to access it, and

2. was offensive to those who worked for the National Identity Register and implied they were corrupt.

CAP Code

Response

1. NO2ID said that the purpose of the ad was to highlight the threat to privacy posed by the proposed existence of a National Identity Register, specifically insider abuse, and indirectly to highlight the data-sharing, collating and cross-referencing functions of the Register.  They pointed out that, as the ID card system did not yet exist, most of the ad was a prediction and they felt the claims represented potential likelihoods, based on existing proposals.  They provided the "Schedule For Information That May Be Recorded In Register", from Schedule 1 of the Identity Cards Act 2006; and stated that, although the register might not directly hold health, financial, and criminal records, they believed that this could lead to access to other records.  For example details of all UK citizens on the Register could be transferred and cross-checked inside the Identity and Passport Service (IPS), against the records of births, marriages and deaths, including such "secrets" as a mother's maiden name, a common bank security check question.  They also considered it was likely that a vulnerability in the design of the system might allow for such details to be independently accessible, for example by hackers and said that other incidents, such as the HMRC child benefit records loss, had shown that information could not be stored securely in such a system.  They felt the ad represented a dramatisation of the problems of insider security, that might apply to the National Identity Register, and a coherent compression of some very complex facts.

2. They pointed out the ad stated "I work *on* the Identity Card system" suggesting some development role, rather than a system user, and believed the text would be read like an online boast.  They said the ad had been run since June 2005, with no previous complaints, and featured an actor.  They felt it was deliberately allusive rather than assertive, aimed at an educated and politically-aware audience, intended to disturb its audience, to encourage them to find out more about the issue.  They felt it was clear that they were not accusing all IPS staff or any individual of being corrupt, but suggesting that some individuals might be in the future.  They felt that this would not be seriously offensive to anyone working in a large organisation, as it was an impossible position to maintain that all colleagues and those working on associated projects were honest and always would be.  They did not consider that the ad was likely to cause serious or widespread offence.

The New Statesman said they had a long-standing editorial interest in the topic of identity, the role of technology in civil society and the debates surrounding the ideas of personal freedom, civil liberties and the state. They felt the NO2ID campaign would have seemed appropriate to many of their readers.

Assessment

1. Not upheld

We noted the National Identity Register was not yet in existence, but that under current proposals, the database would not contain health, financial or criminal records.  We considered, however, that readers of the New Statesman would understand that NO2ID was a lobby group opposed to the ID card scheme and that the ad used an illustrative fictionalised account to set out their view that the ID card system was a threat to personal privacy and that a national database system might be vulnerable to abuse.  We noted that the issues relating to the National Identity Register and ID card scheme, including the information the database was likely to hold, had been well documented in the press, and considered people would recognise the ad was deliberately controversial, to encourage discussion on a sensitive political issue.  We concluded that the ad was not misleading.

We investigated the ad under CAP Code clauses 2.2 (Principles), 3.1 (Substantiation), 5.1 (Decency) and 7.1 (Truthfulness), but did not find it in breach.

2. Not upheld

We did not consider that most people would interpret the ad to mean that all those who might work for the National Identity Register, or a similar database scheme, were corrupt and likely to sell confidential information or abuse their position.  We considered people would understand that the ad was highlighting a lobbying group's opinion that a database containing personal information might be vulnerable to abuse by a minority of those who worked with it.   We concluded therefore that the ad was unlikely to cause serious or widespread offence.

We investigated the ad under CAP Code clauses 2.2 (Principles), 3.1 (Substantiation), 5.1 (Decency) and 7.1 (Truthfulness), but did not find it in breach.

Action

No further action necessary.

Adjudication of the ASA Council (Non-broadcast)